Ehh... Welcome back, Mr. Ahmadinejad [?]

On why our rhetoric vis-a-vis the Iranian elections should change.


Unlike bread riots which may grow proportionally to the violence they are met with, electoral revolts weather away rapidly after they peak.

I consider the Iranian electoral revolt to have peaked this week, which started off with seven dead on Monday, and will end with large demonstrations, dubbed ‘the Sea of Green’ in reference to Mousavi’s supporters colour of choice, around the country and abroad over the weekend - and the additional loss of life that we watched live from Iran.


The world public opinion has displayed unusually strong levels of interest and involvement in the outcome of the June 12th elections, and the ensuing protests across Iran.
Rallies and demonstrations on the streets on western capitals are composed mostly of locals sympathetic to the Iranian people’s demands; a sympathy that was largely non-existent two weeks ago.

Western television and media figures, whom we didn’t know had political opinions, have expressed their clear and unequivocal electoral preference for the Iranian election.

Websites created green outlays. Even Google chimed in, hastily adding a Farsi translation facility on its Google Translate website to facilitate the dissemination of the information trickling out of Iran.


This popular interest is nothing short of impressive, and it is heartwarming to realise the sympathy that the Iranian people has gained over just a few days, a sympathy which I hope will outlast the current crisis.
(Though sympathy for the Ukraine or Georgia hasn't outlived their 'Orange' and 'Rose' revolutions by long).

But the scenario which we don’t seem to consider, and which unfortunately appears more plausible everyday, is that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory will be confirmed, and he will remain as president for four more years.

If - when - that happens, the simplistic ‘Mousavi good, Ahmadinejad bad’ dichotomy can only backfire, translating into unprecedented anti-Iranian hostility, which the current geopolitical climate simply cannot handle.

President Obama was elected on a platform of dialogue and reconciliation; the ‘Iran’ chapter of his strategy remains the most explicitly cautious, unsurprising given the strength of the -largely republican - anti-Iran current within his own Congress and the hostility displayed towards Iran by West Jerusalem. An American popular backlash could tip the balance towards the retraction of an amenable Iran policy back into the confrontation zone.

In parallel, the returning belligerent Iranian leadership, severely demonized over this crisis, will be even less amenable to ouvertures from countries it will see as having accused it of fraud and openly supported its opponents.

As an international community and world media, we must tone down the rhetoric. Our governments must not declare political preferences in a foreign country - a thing we would find outrageous if positions were inversed. The media must do its best to provide nothing more than facts, and attempt to reestablish a balance in reporting - political rallies and public declarations occur in both camps.

Because truth is, whatever transpires of this crisis, the Islamic Republic and its institutions will remain largely the same. The leading lines of its internal and foreign policy are unlikely to change drastically.


Is there a risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy here - that accommodating the idea of a second Ahmadinejad term could weaken the Iranian opposition and help Ahmadinejad to power? Highly doubtful. The influence of our media on decisions to be taken at the top of the Iranian political pyramid is probably negligible.

As private individuals, we are allowed to express political passion as we see fit, even if we lack the full picture. But as responsible governments, media and international community as a whole, we are compelled to stick to facts, and more importantly - to think beyond a 24 hours window before we act.